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All About That Place: The Curious Case of Bingo Liberalisation 
in Brazil 
 
TONI WILLIAMS 
 
Le bingo est une forme de jeu souvent associée aux bonnes œuvres, aux services sociaux, 
au divertissement à faibles enjeux et à la sociabilité de la classe ouvrière. Dans bon 
nombre de pays dans le monde, les salles de bingo relèvent d’œuvres de bienfaisance, de 
clubs d’anciens combattants, de femmes âgées et de familles, mais pas au Brésil. Le 
Bingo commercial y a connu une forte croissance pendant une décennie de légalité qui a 
pris fin en 2004. Les salles de bingo légales employaient des dizaines de milliers de 
personnes. Majoritairement des Brésiliens et Brésiliennes de la classe moyenne et de 
bonne éducation y jouaient, ainsi que des femmes et des hommes âgés de la classe 
ouvrière. Toutefois, le jeu, ou plutôt les salles dans lesquelles les gens y jouaient se sont 
transformées en blanchisseries d’argent sale, en sources de corruption des pouvoirs 
publics et en risques pour la sécurité des quartiers urbains. Au moyen d’une analyse 
sociojuridique contextualisée des lieux que sont devenus les salles de bingo brésiliennes 
et de la place qu’elles occupent dans la société brésilienne, cet article suggère qu’il peut 
être intéressant de se pencher sur le rôle qu’occupe le Brésil dans un contexte de 
mondialisation afin de comprendre pourquoi la législation et réglementation brésiliennes 
n’ont pas réussi à institutionnaliser les salles de bingo commerciales pour en faire des 
lieux amusants, sécuritaires et sains en vue d’atténuer les risques qu’elles posaient et 
d’assurer la pérennité du bingo en tant que loisir légal. 
 
Bingo is a form of gaming that is often associated with good works, social services, low 
stakes entertainment, and working-class sociality. In many parts of the world bingo halls 
are the province of charities, veterans’ clubs, older women, and families: But not in 
Brazil. Commercial bingo grew rapidly in Brazil during a decade of legality that ended 
in 2004. Legal bingo halls employed tens of thousands of people and the game was 
widely played by middle-class and well-educated Brazilians as well as older working-
class women and men. However, the game, or more precisely the bingo halls in which it 
was played, came to be regarded as laundries for dirty money, sources of corruption of 
public powers, and risks to the security of urban neighbourhoods. Using contextualised 
socio-legal analysis of the places that Brazilian bingo halls became and their place in 
Brazilian society, this article suggests that it may be insightful to look to the place of 
Brazil in a globalizing world to understand why Brazilian law and regulation failed to 
institutionalise the commercial bingo hall as a site of clean, safe “fun,” to contain the 
risks it posed, and to ensure the continuity of bingo as a legal leisure practice.  
 
 
                                                 
 Toni Williams, Kent Law School, University of Kent, G.A,Williams@Kent.ac.uk. I wish to thank and 
acknowledge my enormous intellectual debts to friends and colleagues on the Bingo project collaboration from 
whom I learned a great deal. I would like to thank in particular Maria Luiza Kurban Jobim who was a wonderful 
research collaborator throughout the project and as ever provided insightful comments on the paper. Thank you 
to the editors, Alex, Donal and Kate for all of your work in bringing together this special issue and for your 
comments and suggestions. The article benefited from careful reading by Iain Ramsay; and was significantly 
improved by the incisive comments and suggestions of two anonymous reviewers and the perceptive, rigorous 
and sensitive editing of the JLSP editors – thank you. All remaining errors and limitations are mine. 
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BRAZIL OPENED UP A DOMESTIC MARKET FOR BINGO during the late-20th century wave 
of gambling liberalisation across the non-Islamic world. It exempted the game from a 
longstanding prohibition of privately owned gambling services and created an institutional 
framework for the development and governance of bingo halls. In terms of sector growth, 
participation and revenues, the legalisation of bingo succeeded. A large number of commercial 
bingo halls sprang up across the country, especially in the large prosperous cities of Southern 
Brazil; they remitted general taxes to the treasury of federal and state governments; they 
supported the development of sports, and Brazilians of different social classes, genders and 
generations, frequented the halls. Brazil’s governance framework for commercial bingo, by 
contrast, seemingly failed. Despite repeated reforms to the legal architecture of its bingo 
market, the state was unable to establish robust and sustainable regulatory arrangements to 
contain the risks it perceived the bingo halls to create. Only seven years after opening up the 
commercial bingo market, the federal government embarked on regulatory measures to close 
it down. These measures met with defiance, resistance and repeated legal and political 
challenges from bingo owners and managers, workers and players, but to no avail. By 2007, 
less than fifteen years after legalisation, Brazil had, in effect, repealed the exemption from 
prohibition and repositioned its bingo halls outside the law.  
 
Brazil’s experience of bingo legalisation is unusual in a few respects. In many countries, 
bingo is firmly associated with good works, social services, low-stakes entertainment, and 
working-class female sociality and the bingo hall is the province of charities and churches, 
veterans clubs, families, and older women. 1  Brazil’s bingo sector started with a social 
dimension in the sense that the original justification for legalisation was to support the 
development of sports and leisure. Once legalised, however, the bingo halls were engulfed in 
scandals about organized crime, money laundering, and corruption. Within a few years of 
legalization, the Brazilian bingo hall had acquired a reputation, akin to that which Skolnick 
attributed to the US casino as “a most accessible … laundry for the vast quantities of dirty 
money that accumulate annually … through skimming, bribery, corruption and crime.”2  
 
A corollary to that reputation is Brazil’s distinctive framing of the principal risks that 
bingo halls were perceived to pose and the harms that their regulation failed to control in terms 
of criminality risks to state, culture and society from corruption, criminal networks and money 
laundering. While the containment of criminality risk is a conventional justification for 
gambling regulation in many jurisdictions, it is unusual for popular and policy discourse to 
associate this risk so strongly with the game of bingo as occurred in Brazil. Relatedly, the 
prominence given to criminality risk in Brazil tended to displace concerns about risks to player 
health and financial security that feature so significantly in policy debates about gambling 
regulation elsewhere. 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Brazilian state ended the process of liberalisation so 
soon after starting it. Termination of the bingo market contradicts the reported tendency of 
gambling liberalisation processes to gather momentum and become unstoppable. 3  It also 
                                                 
1 Kate Bedford, “Bingo Regulation and the Feminist Political Economy of Everyday Gambling: In Search of the 
Anti-Heroic” (2016) 13:6 Globalizations 801–14. 
2 Jerome Skolnick, House of Cards: legalization and control of casino gambling (Boston: Little Brown, 1978) at 
47.  
3 Peter Adams, Gambling, Freedom and Democracy (London: Routledge, 2008); Sytze Kingma, “Gambling and 
the risk society: the liberalisation and legitimation crisis of gambling in the Netherlands” (2004) 4:1 International 
Gambling Studies 47–67.  
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conflicts with the treatment of Brazil’s most significant legal gambling modality, the state-
owned lottery. Federal lottery games and playing opportunities proliferated in part through 
government entrepreneurship and willingness to maintain a facilitative regulatory framework 
illustrating that in Brazil—as Adams, Kingma and others have found elsewhere—the state can 
become reliant on gambling revenues, implicated in expansion of the gambling economy and 
invested in avoiding excessive disruption of the lucrative activity. 4  The rapid growth of 
commercial bingo premises and business revenues after legalisation shows that Brazil’s 
enabling regulatory framework did permit momentum to build and in that sense the case fits 
the early stages—emergence and regulation—of the proliferation thesis, but the normalization 
phase was never fully institutionalized.5 In the case of Brazil’s bingo halls, liberalisation was 
not too strong to stop. 
 
Stimulated by these observations—and noting in particular that popular and official 
understandings of the Brazilian bingo hall as a site of corruption and source of criminality risk 
arose from the game’s legalisation, not its prohibition—this article explores the apparent 
unwillingness or inability of the Brazilian state to manage these risks and institutionalise the 
commercial bingo hall as a lawful place. Working from the premise that it may not be useful 
simply to view the state’s unwillingness or inability to manage criminality risk as a 
consequence of regulatory inadequacies, potentially correctable through reform—because that 
conclusion begs the question about why effective reform did not occur—this article asks how 
did Brazil benefit from its swift reversion to illegality? 
 
To answer that question, this article draws on case study research on Brazil’s regulation 
of its bingo market. The data collected include twenty semi-structured interviews of individuals 
with knowledge and experience of bingo in Brazil during and after legalization, including 
players and former bingo owners, judges, lawyers, and public servants involved in law 
enforcement, industry analysts, journalists and politicians, addiction researchers, and support 
services providers.6 These interviews were conducted by my research collaborator, Maria 
Luiza Kurban Jobim, with individuals located in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, the two 
states that hosted the highest numbers of bingo businesses when bingo was legal; Rio de 
Janeiro, a state that has a long tradition of popular gambling and is home to prominent gaming 
industry analysts and lobbyists; and the Distrito Federal, the location of the nation’s capital and 
seat of the Federal government which is responsible for gambling legislation. Other case study 
data include legislative and regulatory texts on gambling regulation in Brazil, case law, data 
and commentary published by the Commissão Parliamentar de Inquérito dos Bingos, (CPI dos 
Bingos) a comprehensive federal inquiry into bingo in Brazil and secondary sources ranging 
                                                 
4 Supra note 3. In 2014, the total revenues from federal government lotteries were about R$13.5 billion, CAIXA 
LOTERIAS (2014) A sorte em números, online: <http://www.caixa.gov.br/Downloads/caixa-
loterias/2014_A%20sorte%20em%20numeros.pdf> [perma.cc/M7KD-P8UK] at 50.  This was more than three 
times the R$4.1 billion annual revenue reported in the 2006 Parliamentary Inquiry into bingos, Relatório da 
comissão parlamentar de inquérito referente ao relatório final da CPI: Bingos. Brasília, DF: Senado Federal, 
2006, online < http://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/bitstream/handle/id/82024/RelFinalBingos.pdf?sequence=11> 
[perma.cc/HLN3-23Z3] > (hereinafter, CPI dos Bingos) 83. The Inquiry indicated that the Brazilian state benefits 
proportionately more than others from the lottery because it pays out only one-third of its revenues in prizes 
(retaining the remaining two-thirds for operating expenses, sports development purposes, cultural, development, 
social security, prisons, and higher education) as compared to the 40-50% of revenues paid out by other national 
lotteries, at 84. 
5 Adams, supra note 3 at 33. 
6 The research team did not directly observe or participate in any games because bingo halls were unlawful at the 
time of this study. 
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from newspaper archives through journal articles, websites, and blogs to PhD theses.7 These 
data are analysed by reference to shifts in regulatory outputs, that is the regulatory instruments 
and agents that the state deployed, rather than the party-political processes that produced the 
changes.8  
 
The article makes two main claims. First, that the business and property relations of 
Brazil’s legalized bingo halls turned these places into channels for illicit funds to flow from 
impugned sources and into arrangements that corrupted public powers. In this setting, the 
reversion to illegality became a means to eliminate a point of access to state actors for criminal 
networks. Second, the article suggests that at the turn of the 21st century the places that the 
bingo halls had become—and the criminalised activities that they housed—were perceived not 
only to threaten internal security, but also to jeopardise Brazil’s place in the world, that is, to 
pose a risk to the country’s political aspirations for “soft power” and increased recognition as 
a significant actor in the international economy.9 In relation to these aspirations, the Brazilian 
state’s capacity to stake and enforce visible and meaningful boundaries between legal and 
illegal practices potentially served to communicate important reputational information about 
sovereignty and about its stance on international cooperation. Its use of the criminal instrument 
to reposition the bingo house as unlawful thus allowed Brazil to demonstrate, at one and the 
same time, sovereign powers of control within its own territory, including the power to manage 
internal security and to discipline its markets; and, somewhat paradoxically, its integration into 
a global economy that demands even of powerful states compliance with increasingly stringent 
and intrusive requirements to monitor financial flows and manage the risks that they pose. 
 
Part I summarises the development of the Brazilian bingo market as a social and 
economic institution after legalisation of the game in 1993. After a brief introduction to the 
prohibition era context of gambling practice, this part discusses where legal bingo halls were 
established, who used them, and the kinds of places they became. Part II describes the 
governance of commercial bingo in Brazil through the legal and regulatory provisions that 
initially enabled and then suppressed the bingo hall. Part III explores the international political 
economy context of the Brazilian state’s resort to criminalisation to dismantle an apparently 
successful industry. It outlines the contradictory effects of a nascent political-economic order 
that fed Brazil’s ambitions for international influence and the concurrent rise of a normative 
order governing transnational financial flows that imposed stringent demands on Brazil to 
manage the very risks that its bingo houses seemingly exacerbated. Reflecting on the tensions 
and contradictory effects of these orders, the article concludes that the repositioning of the 
bingo hall as a criminalised space enabled the state to demonstrate an ability to respond robustly 
                                                 
7 More details on the case study can be found at Kate Bedford et al, The Bingo Project Report: Rethinking 
Gambling Regulation, online: <kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject/resources/Bingo_Project_report_final.pdf> 
[perma.cc/RC8Q-KY24]. Sections of this article are taken from the text of the project report, but the argument 
and analysis are new. 
8 For an outline of some of the interests at play in debates over bingo regulation in Brazil, see Maria Luiza Kurban 
Jobim and Toni Williams, “Chance Developments: bingo regulation in Brazil” (2017) Revista Análise Econômica 
35, online: <seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/AnaliseEconomica/issue/view/2992> [perma.cc/2VET-MPXQ] 103–19. For 
detailed discussion of the political interests engaged by gambling regulation debates in Brazil, see Matthew Vaz, 
The Jackpot Mentality: The Growth of Government Lotteries and the Suppression of Illegal Numbers Gambling 
in Rio de Janeiro and New York City (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2011) [unpublished].  
9 Joseph Nye, “Soft power” (1990) 80 Foreign policy 153–171; on Brazil’s aspirations, see for example, Harold 
Trinkunas, “Brazil's Rise: Seeking Influence on Global Governance” (2014) Latin America Initiative, online: 
<calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43088/Trinkunas_Brazils_Rise_2014.pdf> [perma.cc/VC3K-6JLK]; 
Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: the story of a country transformed (Palgrave: New York, 2012). 
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to a home-grown risk in ways that comport with international priorities about disrupting 
impugned financial flows. As such, the reversion to criminalization of the bingo hall potentially 
contributed to Brazil advancing or at least protecting its international standing in the global 
economy. 
  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN BINGO HALL  
  
A. GAMBLING UNDER PROHIBITION IN BRAZIL 
 
Bingo was legalised in Brazil as an exemption to the suppression of gambling that had been 
enacted in the 1940s under Presidents Getúlio Vargas and Gaspar Dutra.10 The 1946 law, 
sponsored by President Dutra, justified the suppression of gambling by reference to universal 
values, shared internationally, and Brazil’s cultural, moral, and religious traditions.11 Then, as 
now, relationships between Brazilian politics, religion, social morality, and cultural practice, 
were complex and contradictory. Described recently as both the “most Catholic” and the “most 
Pentecostal” country in the world,12 formally, Brazil had no established state religion after 
1890, the advent of the first Republic. During the early 1940s, however, when the country was 
internationally-renowned for its flourishing casinos, it was also in the grip of a powerful 
NeoChristendom movement that sought to re-establish the Catholic Church at the heart of the 
Brazilian state.13 Its project to “re-Catholiciz[e] Brazil from the top down”14 was articulated at 
the inauguration of Rio’s famous Corcovado statue (Christ the Redeemer) when the 
Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro issued an ultimatum to President Vargas that “either the State … 
will recognize the God of the people or the people will not recognize the State.”15 The same 
project is implicit in the justification of President Dutras’ prohibition legislation in terms of 
Brazil’s religious traditions. 
  
Suppression of the gambling economy was resisted by casino owners through legal 
challenges that sought exemptions from the legislation and extensions of licences, but the 
                                                 
10 Decreto-Lei no 3.688/1941 & Decreto-Lei no 9.215/ 1946. Brasília, DF, 1946. (Coleção de Leis do Brasil, v. 
3). Gambling offences were classified as contraventions (roughly equivalent to misdemeanours) rather than 
serious crimes, so that convictions carried less moral turpitude than Criminal Code offences and penalties were 
less harsh. 
11 Decreto-Lei No 9.215/1946, Preamble.  
12 Rudolph von Sinner, “Pentecostalism and Citizenship in Brazil: Between Escapism and Dominance” (2012) 6:1 
International Journal of Public Theology 99–117 at 102.  
13 Darién Davis discusses Brazil’s successful casino sector of the 1930s in Darien Davis, White Face, Black Mask: 
Africaneity and the Early Social History of Popular Music in Brazil (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University 
Press, 2009). 
14 Ralph Della Cava, “Catholicism and society in twentieth-century Brazil” (1976) 11:2 Latin American Research 
Review 7–50 at 11. Religion continues to exert a significant influence over many aspects of Brazilian politics and 
culture today. Catholicism, Pentecostalism and other charismatic traditions and Syncreticism are still widely 
practiced. More than 90 per cent of Brazilians are religiously affiliated and religious leaders are culturally 
influential in some respects. They also wield political power: five out of thirty-two official political parties are 
religious and, while most of these parties are small in terms of the number of representatives in the legislature, 
under Brazil’s highly fragmented and individualized electoral system, they frequently are able to bargain for 
socially conservative policies. There is longstanding hostility towards the animal game, Brazil’s popular illegal 
numbers game—and the entrepreneurs who run it—amongst religious leaders, but religious opposition to bingo 
did not emerge as a significant theme in our interviews. The case study does not explore the reasons for this 
difference but it is worth noting that Catholic and Pentecostal churches offer non-commercial bingo games to 
raise funds for buildings and social projects, which could account for a less hostile stance towards the game.  
15 Ibid at 14. 
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legislation made lawful private-sector provision of popular gambling services impossible. 
While the legislation destroyed the formal casino sector as intended, the scope of prohibition 
was never all-encompassing in terms of the law in the books or in practice: for example, poker 
was de facto exempted from the legislation because it was defined as a game of skill and on-
track betting was allowed through private clubs.16  
 
Mass-participation gambling in Brazil also continued in two forms after prohibition: 
legal lottery games offered by the public sector and Brazil’s privately-provided illegal numbers 
game, the jogo do bicho (“animal game”).17 Both flourished throughout the 20th century and 
remain popular today, with the federal lottery operator reporting annual revenue of R$13.5 
billion in 2014 and the jogo do bicho reportedly generating an estimated R$12 billion in extra-
legal revenues for its entrepreneurs.18 Building on their ownership of illegal gambling services, 
entrepreneurs of the jogo do bicho numbers game often consolidated local power bases through 
investments in social, political and cultural activities, including the Samba Schools that parade 
during Carnival and local services in underserved favelas, as well as in petty corruption.19 In 
addition to their involvement in the illicit gambling that continued in Brazil throughout the 
prohibition era, some of these entrepreneurs reputedly are heavily engaged in other illegal 
trades, including narcotics and firearms trafficking within and beyond Brazil.20  
 
B. THE BRAZILIAN BINGO HALL 1993-2006 
 
After legalization opened the market in 1993, bingo halls were established in every one of 
Brazil’s twenty-six states and the Distrito Federal, but they were unevenly distributed across 
the country. By the early 2000s, the regulator, the Caixa Econômica Federal (CAIXA), had 
issued licences for 924 bingo halls, half (468) of which were located in São Paulo, Brazil’s 
largest and richest state, with another 140 bingo halls (15 per cent of all bingo businesses) 
located in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s fourth richest state. The remaining five states of Brazil’s 
prosperous South and South East regions together hosted 183 bingo halls, about 20 per cent of 
the total. According to the CAIXA data, 87 per cent of the country’s bingo businesses were 
located in its wealthiest states, as compared to an estimated 57 per cent of Brazil’s population.21 
By contrast, seven states clustered in Brazil’s poorest region, the North, together hosted fewer 
than twenty bingo businesses, just two per cent of the total. Southern Brazil then, as now, was 
                                                 
16  Eduardo Mahon, “Poker não deve ser considerado contravenção” (2011) Consultor Jurídico, online: 
<conjur.com.br/2011-jan-23/habilidade-jogador-decisiva-ganho- jogo-poker> [perma.cc/CJ4B-LWRU]. 
17 This privately-run lottery game that traces its origins to the marketing of the first zoo in Rio de Janeiro during 
the 1890s has been extremely popular in Brazil, since its inception, despite being positioned almost entirely 
outside the law. See Amy Chazkel, Laws of Chance: Brazil’s Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public 
Life in Brazil (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011) for a rich and insightful historical and socio-legal 
anthropology of the development of the jogo do bicho; Vaz, supra note 8 offers a rich account of contemporary 
developments. 
18 A sorte em numeros, supra note 4; Samantha Pearson, “Brazil hopes gambling will reverse its fortunes: 
Government eyes tax revenues to plug country’s budget deficit” Financial Times (5 September 2016) online: 
<ft.com/content/646bac98-6d72-11e6-a0c9-1365ce54b926>. 
19 See generally, Michel Misse, “Mercados ilegais, redes de proteção e organização local do crime no Rio de 
Janeiro” (2007) 21:61 Estudos avançados 139–157. For extensive commentary on the work of bicheiros as social 
and cultural services entrepreneurs, see Vaz, supra note 8.  
20 Mac Margolis, “Brazilian Authorities Link Lottery to Political Corruption” Los Angeles Times (9 April 1994) 
online: <articles.latimes.com/1994-04-09/news/mn-43915_1_brazilian-authorities> [perma.cc/78SY-URHE]; 
See also discussion in Vaz, supra note 8 at 393, 400–04. 
21  “2000 Census estimates” Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, online: 
<ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/primeiros_resultados_amostra/tabela_regioes.shtm> 
[perma.cc/5SKJ-YYNH]. 
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much more populous than the North, but, as Table 1 below shows, the distribution of bingos 
was considerably more skewed towards prosperous regions and states than was the distribution 
of the population.  
 
A study conducted by the CPI dos Bingos during the mid-2000s located more bingo 
businesses (1547) across the country than had the regulator, with notably higher numbers in 
poorer states. It too showed substantial regional disparity, however, as the number of bingos in 
the North (29) and North East (184) regions, home to an estimated 35 per cent of Brazil’s 
population, amounted to less than 15 per cent of the total, while two-thirds (68 per cent) of 
bingos were concentrated in four states in the South and South East where two-fifths (42 per 
cent) of the population live. These data confirm that the state of São Paulo hosted the largest 
number of bingo halls (595), although, at 38 per cent, its share of the total number of businesses 
was smaller than the CAIXA data had indicated and somewhat less disproportionate to its 22 
per cent share of the Brazilian population. With 224 bingos, the state of Rio Grande Do Sul 
again hosted the second largest number of bingos and in this study, its share amounted to about 
15 per cent of the total number of bingo businesses in the country, about two and one-half times 
its share of the Brazilian population. 
  
Table 1: Distribution of population and bingo businesses in Brazil, early 2000s 
 
Region Share of Brazil’s 
population in 2000 (%) ** 
Share of licenced bingo 
businesses recorded by 
regulator (%)* 
Share of bingo halls 
estimated by Commission 
of Inquiry (%)* 
North 7.6 1.9 2.5 
North East 28 8.9 11.9 
South East 42 62.3 53.4 
State of São Paulo 21.8 50.6 38.5 
South 15 23.2 26.1 
State of Rio Grande do Sul 5.9 15.1 14.5 
Central West 6.8 3.4 6 
* Percentages calculated from data reported in the CPI dos Bingos  
** Percentages calculated from 2000 census estimates, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística, online: 
<ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2000/primeiros_resultados_amostra/tabela_r
egioes.shtm> [perma.cc/5SKJ-YYNH]. 
 
Bingo halls generated substantial business revenues recorded officially at almost R$390 
million in 2001 and 2002.22 But this figure substantially understates annual receipts according 
to the sector’s regulator. Indeed, the CAIXA estimated that only about 10-20 per cent of bingo 
hall revenues had been reported.23 About 20 per cent of the revenues that the regulator collected 
in 2001 and 2002 were remitted to specific purposes including the funding of Sports 
                                                 
22 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 105. 
23 Ibid. 
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Federations (7 per cent), the ministry of Sports (4.5 per cent) and Brazil’s Olympic Committee 
(1-2 per cent) and funding of the regulator itself (7 per cent).24 Additional tax revenue from 
bingo halls was raised through general taxes on salaries and profits and specific taxes for 
designated purposes.  
 
Many Brazilians patronised the bingo halls during their heyday with a 2006 national 
opinion survey reporting that 15 per cent of the population had attended a bingo hall at least 
once.25 Men (20 per cent) were twice as likely as women (10 per cent) to report having attended 
a bingo hall, and men (at 23 per cent) were more likely than women (16 per cent) to favour 
legalisation of bingo halls and slot-machines though, men and women were equally likely 
(about half of those surveyed) to oppose it.26  
 
Adults of all age groups frequented the bingo halls with those aged 20-39 being just as 
likely to report having played there as those in their 50s and 60s. Twenty-three per cent of the 
population with the highest level of formal education reported having visited a bingo hall as 
compared to only 9 per cent of the least formally educated; and those with the highest incomes 
(28 per cent) were more than twice as likely as the lowest income earners (12 per cent) to report 
to have gone to a bingo hall.27  
 
Contemporaneous newspaper stories and visits to working bingos that were reported in 
the CPI dos Bingos indicate (consistent with recollections of interviewees in this case study) 
that many legalised bingo halls targeted middle-aged and affluent people, promoting bingo as 
a sophisticated leisure option and developing the premises as a conducive environment for both 
relaxation and business networking. For example, Zero Hora, a newspaper based in Rio Grande 
do Sul, the state with the most disproportionately large share of bingos, contrasted a recently-
established bingo hall that had “a carpeted environment filled with mirrors, full of electronic 
equipment and waiters in ties serving imported whisky” with the former image of a bingo hall 
“… [as] a common room with long tables, dining chairs, straw on the floor and underpaid 
workers trying to have fun or earn some money without spending a lot,” concluding that under 
legalization, “bingo has become a chic leisure option.”28 The same newspaper quotes the proud 
boast of a director of a large bingo hall in Porto Alegre, that his bingo hall “bring[s] together 
people representing 90% of the [state’s] GDP.”29 
 
Some bingo halls invested substantially in decor and fittings to convey opulence, 
glamour, and excess. One respondent reminisced that a well-known bingo hall in his city “was 
famous for being one of the most luxurious places in the city … the first time I went it was a 
beautiful place with lovely chairs and tables made of marble.”30 Similarly, researchers working 
on behalf of the CPI dos Bingos observed of Bingo Imperatriz in São Paulo that its 
“sumptuousness is easy to see even from the outside, which is adorned with plenty of light and 
statues of African figures. The luxurious interior is impressive. There is carpeting all over the 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid at Anexo II-D, table 19.  
26 Ibid at Table 18. 
27 Ibid at Table 19. 
28 Solano Nascimento, “Bingo vira forma chique de lazer” Zero Hora (12 November 1994). In this comment the 
speaker appears to compare the new high-end bingo halls that had recently emerged with the facilities opened in 
1993 immediately after legalisation or it may be that the speaker intended to contrast the new bingo halls with 
informal clandestine bingo facilities established under prohibition. The newspaper story is ambiguous. 
29 Ibid. 
30 BR01. 
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floor, an aquarium full of carp under a glass floor and the space is decorated with more than 
100 statues.”31 Evidence that the Imperatriz had succeeded in reaching its target demographic 
appears in the investigators’ report, which comments that judged by their cars, dress, and 
comportment, the clientele of the Imperatriz came from Brazil’s wealthiest social classes.32  
 
Most bingo halls, even those targeting the well-off, were more modestly appointed than 
the Imperatriz, though still very comfortable. An observation of another São Paulo bingo hall 
observes, for example, that despite also serving clients from the wealthiest social classes, the 
Itaim “does not have the same luxury as Bingo Imperatriz; however, it is not a simple place 
and it has its refinements. The entire floor is carpeted and the room where the card game of 
bingo is played is as modern as the largest bingo hall in São Paulo.”33 Reporting on “the largest 
and most luxurious” bingo hall in Florianópolis, in the Southern state of Santa Catarina, the 
police investigators comment that although its “luxury, decoration and refinement do not 
measure up to the best and most luxurious bingo halls in the city of São Paulo, its similarity 
with the best bingos in São Paulo is the wall-to-wall carpeting.”34 
 
Large, luxurious bingo halls catered to prosperous Brazilians. Other bingos, targeting 
lower income people, were less well-appointed in terms of decor and furnishings. The manager 
of a bingo hall in Porto Alegre commented that her business “with its plastic tables and chairs 
and reusable cards mostly attracts the lower and middle classes … the public who really 
understands bingo.”35 Another newspaper story about a plainly-outfitted bingo hall that offered 
the lowest prices in the city of Porto Alegre, quotes the owner’s description of their clients as 
“clients simples” (ordinary people).36 More modest bingo halls might be placed in shopping 
malls and unlike the Imperatriz their exteriors could be quite nondescript: everyday 
accessibility was part of the appeal.37 One interviewee recalled, for example, “a huge bingo on 
two floors [that] gave us dinner, afternoon coffee … everything… One floor was only slot 
machines, another floor was only card bingo. It was in a mall and always packed because the 
people who worked at the mall played a lot.”38 
 
Within a few years of the opening of the bingo market, the spatial segregation that this 
comment alludes to between group-based bingo, played on cards, and individualised play in 
rooms full of electronic game machines, had become typical of the Brazilian bingo hall.39 
Businesses that served richer and poorer clienteles alike divided publicly-used space between 
the well-lit, environments of comfortable rooms where people sat at tables shared space to play 
the conventional card-based bingo game, and large dimly lit spaces stocked with hundreds of 
electronic machines where individuals played alone. 
 
Spatial separation of different gambling modalities mapped onto gender and generational 
differences in how people used the premises. Although women and men at times occupied all 
publicly-accessible places within the bingo hall, women generally were more likely to play 
                                                 
31 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at Anexo II-B, Relatórios de visitações a casas de bingos, Bingo Imperatriz 23 at 
1209.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid at 1211. 
34 Ibid at 1220. 
35 Nascimento, supra note 28 at 5. 
36 Ibid (original Portuguese) “Estabelecimentos mais simples buscam a atrair a classe baixa” 
37 For example, Center Bingo, Florianópolis, CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 1223. 
38 BR02. 
39 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at Anexo II-B, Relatórios de visitações a casas de bingos.  
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card-based bingo and men tended to frequent the rooms housing electronic machines.40 Older 
people were more likely to use the space dedicated to card games and younger ones to choose 
the machines.41 Revenues from electronic gaming machines (EGMs) could be substantial with 
the report of the CPI dos Bingos finding that “in São Paulo electronic gaming machines 
represent 80 per cent of the profit from bingo halls, sometimes reaching 90 per cent.”42 Bingo 
halls normally rented the machines, paying monthly an agreed share of the machines’ revenue 
or (less frequently) a fixed rental per machine.43 
 
Operating hours often differed between the two types of spaces: rooms housing machines 
(and ATMs) might open for 20-24 hours per day, while those housing card-based play kept 
shorter hours.44 Some bingo halls divide up usage by time to cater to players with different 
desires, needs, and constraints. One former bingo owner described how he had tailored 
advertising, refreshments, and incentives to different demographic groups to maximise 
productive use of the place: during the day it attracted elderly people who wanted to socialise 
with their friends; and in the early evening it targeted workers trying to avoid the city’s 
notorious traffic jams. Later in the evening, the business was aimed at people who wished to 
extend their leisure time after eating dinner; and in the early hours of the morning, it catered to 
night workers such as security guards, and restaurant and bar managers who needed a place to 
chill out after work.45  
 
This overview of the Brazilian bingo hall under legalisation shows that these places 
became popular and successful businesses in much of the country, catering to their local 
communities through employment, consumption opportunities, and the provision of leisure 
facilities. Electronic gaming machines of various types were integral to their development at 
least in the major urban centres of the prosperous South and South East, leading the CPI dos 
Bingos to observe that the prevalence of machines “detracts somewhat from the idea that these 
places should be considered bingos and makes them seem more like casinos.”46  
 
Bingo halls replicated Brazil’s well-entrenched class divisions. In keeping with their 
casino-like attributes, bingos were mostly patronised by wealthy, well-educated men in the 
country’s richest areas although they certainly attracted others as well, including older women 
and men. Pervasive disregard of some aspects of law was manifested through the bingo halls 
dispensing of cigarettes and the prevalence of smoking within them. 47 But this form of petty 
illegality hardly accounts for the reputation that the bingo hall had acquired by the time the 
market closed, when, according to the Parliamentary Inquiry, half (51 per cent) of Brazil’s 
population associated bingos with “criminal practices such as money laundering, tax evasion 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 115. 
43 Ibid at Anexo II-B, Relatórios de visitações a casas de bingos. 
44 E.g. Golden Bingo in Florianópolis opened 24 hours per day, Ibid at 118, while the Imperatriz, Imperador and 
Itaim in São Paulo, which were under the same management, all opened their electronic machine rooms from 
09:00-07:00, closing for 2 hours per day for cleaning, and their (card)-based bingo rooms were open for 12 hours 
per day, from 13:00-01:00. CPI dos bingos, supra note 4 at Anexo II-B, Relatórios de visitações a casas de bingos.  
45 BR09. 
46 CPI dos Bingos at 115.  
47 CPI dos Bingos Researchers visiting bingos in 2006 noted that smoking was common with staff in some bingo 
halls dispensing free cigarettes, even though smoking had long been banned in publicly used spaces since 1996. 
Lei No 9294/96, online: <camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/1996/lei-9294-15-julho-1996-349045-normaatualizada-
pl.html> [perma.cc/V28S-G2C2]. 
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and increasing violence.”48 To understand why 43 per cent of Brazilians surveyed in 2006 
would express the view that “bingo halls have no positive features,”49  in effect, why the 
regulation failed to ensure public confidence in the licensed bingo market, this article now turns 
to the governance of Brazil’s commercial bingo sector. 
 
II. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF COMMERCIAL BINGO 
REGULATION IN BRAZIL  
 
A. THE THREE PHASES OF BRAZIL’S COMMERCIAL BINGO 
REGULATION  
 
Brazil’s regulation of its bingo market can be divided into three phases according to how the 
state wielded the illegality instrument. It lifted illegality between 1993 to 2000 to create a 
market for lawful bingo; partially reapplied illegality from 2000-06, which restricted supply 
and placed many bingo halls in a shadow zone of openly contested legality; and fully restored 
illegality in 2007, driving the game underground. These latter shifts were justified politically 
on the grounds that the bingo halls offered criminal networks places from which to launder 
money, generate corrupt arrangements, and damage public security. 
 
The bingo market was opened by Lei Zico, a law not about gambling as such but about 
the democratisation and financing of sport. 50  Article 217 of the 1988 (post-dictatorship) 
Constitution characterizes participation in sport as an individual right in Brazil and imposes 
duties on the state to foster the exercise of this right, to respect the autonomy of sports 
federations, to fund the practice of sports in education and some high performance sports, to 
protect and incentivize the development of national sports, and to encourage leisure as a means 
of promoting society. 51 Lei Zico was enacted in 1993 to give effect to these new constitutional 
obligations. It sought to foster the development of sport and at the same time “to embed in the 
arena of sports a predominant philosophy of ‘destatisation’ … eliminating state interference in 
the internal business of sports clubs.”52  To that end, Article 57, which contains the only 
reference to bingo in the legislation, authorises state treasuries to permit sports organisations 
to raise money for sports development by holding “a type of sweepstakes called Bingo, or 
similar.” 
 
Substantive rules on bingo governance and regulation were enacted in November 1993, 
modified in 1998 by Lei Pelé,53 and again in 2000 by Lei Maguito.54 These rules created an 
institutional framework for sports organisations to develop and market the game, covering 
matters such as accreditation requirements for market entry, premises occupancy, licensing of 
owners, operators and premises, returns to players and remittance of revenues to sports 
development, and to pay for the regulator, reporting and accountability requirements, including 
                                                 
48 Ibid at 120. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Lei no 8.672/93. 
51  Art 217, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Câmara dos Deputados, online: 
<livraria.camara.leg.br/direito-e-justica/constitution-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil.htm> and in English at: 
<constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf> [perma.cc/92YH-EHCD]. 
52 Dossiê Lei Zico, Brazil, Câmara dos Deputados, PL 965–1991 (Folha 3 da E.M. No 002, de 28 de fevereiro de 
1991). 
53 Lei No 9.615/98 (Lei Pelé). 
54 Lei No 9.981/2000. 
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certification standards for bingo halls covering equipment, premises, licensees’ financial 
standing, and records of compliance with safety, labour and consumer laws.  
 
Lei Zico placed responsibility for financial supervision on the treasury departments of 
Brazil’s 26 states and the Distrito Federal but made no provision to fund this regulatory work. 
Lacking the expertise to govern the diverse businesses in the emerging bingo market, many 
state treasuries delegated their regulatory powers to the organisations that ran state lotteries. 
Regulatory activity across the country was quite uneven with no guarantee of effective 
governance even in states with large bingo industries. In São Paulo, for example, the lottery-
regulator … “just existed on paper drawn up by the Secretary of the Treasury … It never 
worked … Entrepreneurs soon realised that what they did would not be monitored and that’s 
what started the fragile relationship between bingos and public authorities.”55 
 
Lei Pelé replaced Lei Zico in 1998 after corruption scandals occurred in states that 
regulated substantial commercial bingo markets. It shifted regulatory authority over the bingo 
market to the federal government, which then delegated the responsibility to the National 
Sports Development Institute (INDESP). This small agency lacked the resources to regulate 
the bingo economy effectively. It therefore contracted with existing state regulators to continue 
their local supervisory arrangements, including some whose corrupt relationships with bingo 
entrepreneurs were known.56 Regulation at the state level persisted in about half of Brazil’s 26 
states and the Distrito Federal, with the effect that conditions were ripe for established corrupt 
relationships to continue. INDESP proved to be no more effective or incorruptible than the 
states that regulated Brazil’s bingo halls. In the wake of a jurisdictional conflict over the 
regulation of electronic gaming machines in states to which INDESP had contracted out its 
regulatory powers,57 evidence emerged of systematic bribery of INDESP staff to buy their 
support for further increases in the number and type of electronic machines permitted in bingo 
halls.58 
 
Brazil’s federal government responded to this scandal by closing down entry to the bingo 
market in 2000, a mere seven years after it had opened the market. Lei Maguito withdrew the 
authority to grant new bingo licences but allowed established bingo halls to continue until 
expiry of their (renewable) licences. This legislation also transferred responsibility for 
supervision and surveillance from INDESP to the CAIXA, which ran the successful federal 
lotteries and in 2001 INDESP was shut down.59 At the end of 2002, all federal licences that 
had been given to bingo establishments expired.60  
 
Expiry of the federal licences did not immediately end Brazil’s commercial bingo market 
but instead moved the sector into the second phase of partial (il)legality. This phase relied on 
two techniques to secure continuity of the market: First, states that had regulated bingos within 
their jurisdiction since legalisation on the basis of their own enabling legislation carried on, in 
                                                 
55 BR09.  
56 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 264. 
57 Portaria INDESP n.104/98 made detailed provision for the types of permissible machines and software as well 
as the terms on which licences could be issued, including by the state regulators. It also limited the number of 
machines to 20 per cent of the capacity of the bingo hall.  
58  Portaria INDESP n.23/99 expanded the number of machines. E. Boudens, 2000. Bingo: usos e abusos. 
Consultoria Legislativa. Câmarados Deputados. Centro de Documentação e Informação. Coordenação de 
Públicações Brasília. 
59 Medida Provisoria n.2216-37/2001.  
60 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 27, fn 6. 
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effect exercising the federal government’s power to regulate the bingo sector. Second, some 
state courts became involved in the bingo market after Lei Maguito when owners asked judges 
to issue injunctions (“liminares”) to extend expired licences.61 As there was little consistency 
in the exercise of this judicial power, bingo hall stakeholders found it difficult to understand 
what was required to succeed in court. Moreover, because of the lucrative nature of the 
businesses affected—and the substantial losses occasioned by closure—there were suspicions 
that judges were being corrupted to secure licence extensions. As one interviewee observed: 
“there were judges who allowed bingo halls to operate normally … And there was speculation 
that these injunctions would cost R$1 million, 2 millions, 5 millions… [T]hose who got these 
decisions felt like they had won the lottery.”62  
 
Yet another corruption scandal erupted in 2004. This time, the misconduct was that of an 
associate of a very close adviser to then President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (Lula), and the 
payment the associate had solicited (two years before the video of the transaction surfaced) 
was from a well-known entrepreneur of both bingo and the illegal jogo do bicho. The 
entrepreneur was asked to finance political campaigns for the governing Workers’ Party (PT).63 
A swift assertive response to this scandal was called for because of the damage it caused to the 
Worker’s Party which had risen to power in 2003 with a commitment to stamp out corruption.  
 
Initially, Lula tried to ban the operation of bingos and slot machines across the country 
by issuing a presidential decree. This 2004 response failed, however, because Brazil’s National 
Congress refused the endorsement that was required to bring the decree into effect.64 Reprieved 
by Congress, courts in some states—notably São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul—continued to 
issue discretionary injunctions to extend bingo licences.65  
 
Three events during 2006-7 formally ended commercial bingo in Brazil. First, specialised 
police and prosecutorial offices, established as part of a national strategic response to money 
laundering and corruption, exposed the corruption of state courts that had been issuing 
injunctions to extend bingo licences since the 2000 enactment of Lei Maguito.66 This exposure 
eroded confidence in the integrity of court processes and increased the urgency of the perceived 
need to create an effective response. Second, Brazil’s Constitutional Supreme Court affirmed 
the federal government’s exclusive power over gambling regulation, rendering 
                                                 
61 E.g. Mandado de Segurança N° 70005921507, Quarta Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul, 
Relator: Araken de Assis, Julgado em 28/05/2003 (Rio Grande do Sul); Mandadado de Segurança N° 4730320000 
Relator(a): Linneu Rodrigues de Carvalho S; Comarca; Poá; Órgão Julgador; 7° Câmara; Data do julgamento: 
27/05/2004; Data do registro: 16/06/2004 (São Paulo). Brief summaries of these and similar cases can be found 
in Bedford, supra note 1. 
62 BR13.  
63 Vaz, supra note 8 at 406–8. For a careful analysis of problems created by Brazil’s distinctive electoral system, 
which generates highly individualistic competition within political parties, and campaign financing rules, which 
disadvantage leftist parties, see David Samuels, “Money, elections, and democracy in Brazil” (2001) 43:2 Latin 
American Politics and Society 27–48. 
64 Medida Provisória No 168/ 2004. 
65 Supra note 69. 
66 Operation Hurricane and Operation Themis. Citing federal police sources, the Folha de São Paulo reported the 
arrests of 43 members of a criminal organisation involved in bingo that paid out monthly “maintenance” fees of 
R$20 000 - R$30,000 to legal officials (including judges, prosecutors and tax officials) plus R$150,000 for each 
favourable decision to keep open a bingo hall; Marcelo Guttieres, “PF diz que ‘bingão da Justiça’ pagava R$ 30 
mil por mês a magistrados” Folha de São Paulo (20 April 2007) online: 
<folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u91431.shtml> [perma.cc/J28X-EYP9]. 
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unconstitutional the decisions of the state governments and courts to extend bingo licences.67 
Third, a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, the CPI dos Bingos, was established to 
investigate Brazil’s bingo houses, with an emotive justification:  
 
Organised crime and gambling are ‘conjoined twins’ … Since the very beginning 
in 1993 the bingo halls have rendered a disservice to the Nation… [U]nder the false 
mantle of contributing to the funding of sports clubs, some of these entities have 
been used to launder money derived from criminal activities … The bingo halls 
have as investors—sometimes hidden—known criminals who often represent the 
interests of international mafia organizations.68  
 
After extensive investigation, the CPI dos Bingos concluded that organised crime 
businesses—both domestic and international—had indeed captured much of the Brazilian 
bingo market and used bingo halls as places in which to launder money, negotiate criminal 
conspiracies, and corrupt executive power from federal to municipal levels.69 The inquiry 
nevertheless recommended that the bingo sector should remain lawful, albeit with a 
significantly strengthened regulatory infrastructure. That recommendation was not 
implemented, however, as the state chose instead to terminate the market. 
 
Commercial bingo did not end in Brazil after the reversion to illegality, but it became 
less visible as privately-owned businesses took to offering the game through clandestine bingo 
halls, mobile and online modalities.70  It appears to be widely played: an industry expert 
estimated, for example, that between 200 and 250 clandestine bingos continue to operate in 
Brazil71 while a public prosecutor working in a city that had a vibrant bingo sector during 
legalisation reported that several years after the end of legalized bingo: 
 
… [W]e had about ten illegal bingo halls that were working simultaneously in [the 
city]. So I went there and closed them and the next day they reopened. I tried as a 
strategy to ‘de-capitalise’ illegal bingo halls, seizing everything they used to 
operate the bingo. We sometimes took 300 or 400 chairs, armchairs and tables. 
Even doing this, some bingos were still very fast to reopen … which shows that 
they really had a lot of capital to finance the reopening of these locations.72  
 
Ten years after the restoration of illegality, the state’s positioning of the game as outside 
the law continued to be fiercely contested: Industry lobbyists advocate the revival of a 
commercial market, drawing on, inter alia, recommendations of the CPI dos Bingos and well-
rehearsed claims that have succeeded elsewhere about its potential contributions to government 
revenue streams.73 Within the legislature, attempts have been made to replace prohibition with 
a liberalised regulatory instrument.74 Since October 2017, several investors, claiming to act on 
                                                 
67 Súmula Vinculante nº 2, DJe nº 31/2007, 1, em 6/6/2007, DJ de 6/6/2007, 1; DO de 6/6/2007, 1.  
68 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 7. 
69 Ibid at 12, 134, 122–149. 
70 E.g. BR01, BR02, BR03 
71 BR07. 
72 BR01. 
73 See for example resources on the websites of Instituto Jogo Legal, a Brazilian organization that produces studies 
and lobbies for the legalisaton of gambling in Brazil, http://www.institutojogolegal.com.br and on the Brazil pages 
of Gambling Compliance, a provider of “legal, regulatory and business intelligence to the global gambling 
industry” with offices in the UK and the US, gamblingcompliance.com/in-focus/brazil-sleeping-giant. 
74 E.g. Senado do Brasil PLS 186/2014. 
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the authority of state court decisions, have opened (and then been quickly forced to close) bingo 
halls in Porto Alegre, a city that had sustained a thriving bingo market during the era of 
legalised play.75 
 
B. WHY DID BRAZIL’S BINGO MARKET FAIL? 
 
Several aspects of the regulation influenced how Brazil’s bingo halls developed and eventually 
contributed to the sector becoming engulfed by scandal. The first concerned the capacity of 
bingo owners and operators to meet regulatory standards. It became clear within months of the 
1993 enabling legislation that the sports clubs and federations that had been considered its 
likely beneficiaries lacked the business acumen to develop bingos, the capital to invest in the 
bingo halls and the administrative and management systems to meet basic regulatory standards. 
Regulators responded to this problem by permitting sports organisations to partner with 
commercial investors in bingo halls and share the revenues. According to a former bingo 
owner, “the [regulatory] system they approved was not a good fit for the plan [to stimulate 
sports development] because there were so many certification requirements.”76 The regulations 
did not take account of the impact of certification requirements related to the number of 
employees or scale of operations on large sporting organisations; consequently some of 
Brazil’s best known sporting clubs, which legalization was intended to support, were 
essentially priced out of entry to the bingo market because of the cost of obtaining certification 
to operate a bingo facility and sometimes also the cost of paying outstanding tax liabilities.77  
 
Although smaller clubs might have had similar types of debts and obligations, the sums 
they owed normally would be much lower so that entrepreneurs could pay for the necessary 
certificates to develop a bingo hall in collaboration with a small sports federation. One 
interviewee commented for example, that: “it happened all the time. Licences were obtained 
in partnership with small sports rather than the big sports clubs that the legislators had 
envisaged.”78 Evidence reported by the CPI dos Bingos confirm that small sports benefited 
disproportionately from the bingo halls. Niche activities such as boxing, rowing, and sailing, 
which have relatively few participants in Brazil, were each supported by one of the sixteen 
bingo halls visited by Inquiry investigators. By contrast, fewer than half of the bingos supported 
football, which is by far the most popular sport in Brazil, practiced regularly by more than 13 
million players—and millions more occasionally—and feature a number of very large sports 
clubs. Other popular Brazilian sports, including volleyball, judo, futsal, capoeira, and surfing, 
did not appear at all amongst the beneficiaries of the bingos that the CPI dos Bingos visited.79 
 
Capacity problems were exacerbated by regulatory requirements about places of play. 
The 1993 decree required bingo halls to be established as large-scale businesses, with a 
minimum occupancy of 500 seats, and to be fully equipped with closed-circuit TVs, high 
quality sound, and machine-based drawing systems. These provisions were intended to contain 
                                                 
75 Carlos Rollsing, “Casa de jogos Winfil registra abertura de 10 filiais no RS” Gauchazh (27 February 2018)  
online: <gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/geral/noticia/2018/02/casa-de-jogos-winfil-registra-abertura-de-10-filiais-no-
rs-cje4st5sb022m01qx7etc8hiu.html> [perma.cc/CN4V-Y9EA]. 
76 BR07. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid. For commentary on popular sports in Brazil, see LaMartine P. DeCosta, “Cenário de tendências gerais dos 
esportes e atividades físicas no Brasil” (2006) ATLAS DO ESPORTE NO BRASIL. RIODEJANEIRO:CONFEF; 
Igor Itsumi, “15 Most Popular Sports in Brazil” The Brazil Business (21 July 2014) online: 
<thebrazilbusiness.com/article/15-most-popular-sports-in-brazil> [perma.cc/BV3M-CRZ3]. 
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the risk of fraud and ensure that the new bingo businesses were sufficiently well-capitalised. 
Bingo halls thus demanded substantial investment at a level well beyond the reach of most non-
profit sporting associations and their development also required large-scale effective marketing 
to secure an adequate return on investment. Many bingo developers viewed EGMs as the 
solution to ensure sustainability of the bingo hall. To those favouring expansion, the regulation 
of gaming machines became the focus of lobbying to remove regulatory controls on the number 
of permissible machines in a bingo hall.80  
 
Bingos attracted, among others, entrepreneurs from Brazil’s lucrative illegal gambling 
sector as investors (as well as consumers of gaming and leisure services). By the mid-1990s, 
some owners of large jogo do bicho franchises had accumulated considerable capital from 
trafficking as they had taken advantage of the post-dictatorship opening up of Brazil’s economy 
and borders to diversify into businesses based on illicit flows of finances, services and goods 
(such as narcotics, guns, money and cigarettes) across Brazil’s extensive borders.81 These 
criminalized trades generated huge revenue streams that then had to be integrated into the 
legitimate economy for their value to be realised. As cash intensive businesses that dealt largely 
with anonymous transactions in exceptionally high frequencies and volumes, the commercial 
bingo halls offered good opportunities to launder money, particularly through the gaming 
machines and in-house financial services. Bingo house cheques, loan services, foreign 
exchange facilities and convertible value instruments such as gaming machine chips, vouchers 
and ticket in/ticket out (TITO) systems could be used to trade illicitly-obtained funds for cash 
with a traceable source.82 Bingo halls thus appealed to entrepreneurs of unlawful businesses 
because they created ways to spend, trade, and invest the proceeds of crime that mask its origins 
and convert proceeds into apparently legitimate funds.  
 
Collusion with bingo hall staff opened up other ways to generate ostensibly “clean” 
money from illicitly obtained funds. Employees could be bribed to tamper with gaming 
machines or to conspire with clients in constructing false identities and they could be enticed 
to ignore customers who “smurf” on behalf of clients by performing multiple small transactions 
in amounts below threshold requirements for reporting of suspicious activity.83 According to 
the CPI dos Bingos, the most common forms of collusion in Brazil were the purchase of 
                                                 
80 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4. Other bingo owners, by contrast, blamed slot machines for corruption and the 
ultimate demise of the lawful bingo hall. One former bingo owner indicated, possibly with the benefit of hindsight, 
that he had opposed the installations of electronic gaming machines in his bingo hall because he had believed the 
machines would “finish off” the bingo sector. BR12. 
81  E.g. A. Yürekli & Ö. Sayginsoy, “Worldwide organized cigarette smuggling: an empirical analysis” 
(2010) 42:5 Applied Economics 545–561. CPI dos Bingos includes extensive discussion of the smuggling of 
electronic gaming machines and money and also reports on the involvement of bicheiros with organised crime 
networks from other countries. Brazil’s territory borders 10 different countries (all bar two South American states 
border Brazil). Only China and Russia have longer land borders. Information gathered from Nations online 
Project, online: <nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/brazil-map.htm> [perma.cc/DYE3-BMRU]; CIA World 
Factbook. 
82 FATF-GAFI & APG (2009) Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector (Paris: FATF/OECD). 
83 Definition taken from Gambling Commission report at 33, paraphrasing the FATF definition: The Gambling 
Commission (UK) “Money laundering and terrorist financing risk within the British gambling industry” Oct 2016, 
online: <https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/PDF/AML/Money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risk-
assessment-March-2018.pdf>. On the sector’s vulnerabilities to money laundering, see also FATF, ibid., Canada, 
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre, Money Laundering Typologies and Trends in Canadian 
Casinos, Nov 2009. 
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“winning” cards outside the draw and the over-stating of prizes.84 The former practice was 
particularly popular because the cards showed taxes as deducted at source so that the purchaser 
immediately secured documentary record of legitimacy that could be attached to the illicitly 
obtained funds.  
 
Investment in bingo halls and equipment emerged as another key money-laundering 
strategy pursued by criminal networks.85 Legalisation created new ways to insert cash into the 
formal economy through wages, taxes, rent, and the costs of upkeep of premises. Successful 
management of legalised bingo halls also facilitated the laundering of reputation because it 
legitimated entry into influential networks and afforded investors access to legal institutions 
for dispute resolution unavailable to illegal businesses. These resources of legitimacy and 
access created by legalization of the bingo hall then served as a foundation for investors with 
additional business interests in criminalized flows of other goods and services, such as 
narcotics, arms, and finance, to corrupt political, executive, and judicial institutions within 
Brazil.86  
 
The CPI dos Bingos described three types of schemes by which entrepreneurs of illegal 
gambling and other criminalized networks and actors, including those from outside Brazil, 
invested illicitly-obtained funds into Brazilian bingo halls. One scheme entailed outright 
ownership of a bingo operation, concealed behind layers of property relations, which were then 
registered in the names of third party “straw persons” (testas-de-ferro), often people of modest 
means: Brazilian and Spanish criminalized networks were said to be significant actors in this 
type of scheme.87 Foreign investors, from Italy, France, and Spain, apparently dominated the 
second scheme, which monopolised the importing of electronic gaming machines through 
complex networks of off-shore companies, tax havens, and dummy businesses headed by 
“front-men.”88 Supplying bingo halls was very much secondary to this scheme as its main 
purpose was to launder illicit capital flows from international narcotics trafficking.89 
 
The third scheme grew out of the extortion of tolls from bingo halls by the entrepreneurs 
of local illegal gambling businesses—a practice that began shortly after legalisation. Some of 
these entrepreneurs then diversified into trade in lucrative EGMs within Brazil. They initially 
leased the machines to the legitimate partnerships between sports clubs and commercial 
managers that operated the bingo halls. Illicitly obtained money that had been invested in 
acquisition of the machines would then be returned in the form of legitimate receipts and rent 
from their use. By 2006, such arrangements had developed to the point that some bingo halls 
had been absorbed into large criminal conglomerates often with interests in multiple illegal 
trades. The conglomerates were dominated by members of Brazilian criminal networks and the 
CPI dos Bingos found well-established associations between jogo do bicho entrepreneurs and 
the bingo industry in the Distrito Federal and Goiás (the state in which the Distrito Federal is 
                                                 
84 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 150–03. Cards could also be purchased after the draw directly from the winners. 
This latter technique was also used for the lotteries.  
85 Ibid at ch 4. 
86 Ibid; Larry Rohter, “Brazilian Numbers Game Ties Officials to Mobsters” New York Times (7 June 2007) 
online: 
<nytimes.com/2007/06/07/world/americas/07brazil.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=%22jogo+do+bicho%22&oref=slogi
n> [perma.cc/RSF4-V88A]. 
87 CPI dos bingos, supra note 4 at 135. 
88 Ibid at 134–5.  
89 Ibid at 133–4. 
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located), and in the two states with the largest bingo sectors, Rio Grande do Sul and São 
Paulo.90 
 
In addition to facilitating corruption and the injection of dirty money into the economy, 
Brazilian bingos were considered to be destabilizing presences in urban settings when the 
criminal networks that had invested in them were perceived to conduct narcotics and guns 
trafficking in the same neighbourhoods as the bingo halls.91 And as these illegal trades became 
more visible on the streets, so too did the violent extra-legal enforcement methods practiced by 
criminalized organisations to secure transactions and territories for distributing their goods and 
services.92 Thus, in 2006, the CPI dos Bingos found that some 50 per cent of Brazilians 
associated legalized bingo with increased violence as well as money laundering and tax 
evasion—7 per cent singling out increased violence as its most significant negative effect.93 
 
These findings about the regulation of bingo halls indicate that Brazil closed its bingo 
market not so much because of concerns about harm to players or to suppress play as such, but 
rather to contain the risk to the public interest that the bingo hall had become. While the risks 
of corruption and violence that the Brazilian state sought to address through reversion to 
illegality may be evident, its choice of this stance merits comment. Illegality was restored 
ostensibly because of the state’s inability to control—through less repressive regulatory 
instruments and techniques—the flows of illicitly-obtained funds into the bingo hall and funds 
derived from lawful bingo that were deployed to unlawful ends outside the hall. In practice, 
however, regulation through instruments such as illegality tends to produce crime rather than 
to suppress it and over-reliance on illegality as a regulatory technique, especially against the 
trades and transactions encompassed by “vice” and other economic crimes, risks eroding 
respect for the law and public confidence in a state’s capacity to exert control; and it also 
expands the activities subject to informal and extra-legal means of control including violence.94 
The question thus remains of why Brazil chose reversion to illegality, which tended to 
exacerbate the problem that the state sought to resolve instead of attempting to develop a 
stronger, more effective regulation of a legal bingo market?95  
  
One possible explanation derives from expressive aspects of illegality. Even if the 
criminal instrument does little to reduce a particular site of criminality risk, it nonetheless 
remains a powerful symbol and means to communicate state power. In relation to crimes 
created to control cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital, the communication work 
that the criminal instrument does may be directed out towards the international community, 
which over the past thirty years has acted particularly assertively to demand that states 
criminalise financial flows, as much as it is directed in towards the local one. 
 
                                                 
90 Ibid; The Report noted similar relationships between bingos and entrepreneurs of illegal gambling in Bahia and 
Rio de Janeiro, two states that also had sizeable bingo industries during the legalization era. 
91 Rohter, supra note 86.  
92 For systematic analysis of the high and rising rates of urban violence in Brazil at that time see Joseph Murray, 
Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira and Tulio Kahn, “Crime and violence in Brazil: Systematic review of time 
trends, prevalence rates and risk factors” (2013) 18:5 Aggression and Violent Behavior 471–483. 
93 CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4 at 120; DataSenado, Senado Federal, Pesquisa de Opinião Pública Nacional: O 
Brasileiro e as Casas de Bingo no País, Anexo II-D at 8.  
94 For discussion of criminogenic effects in the specific context of relationships between states and criminal 
networks, see Josiah McC. Heyman (ed), States and Illegal Practices (Oxford: Berg, 2011). 
95 As was recommended by the CPI dos Bingos, supra note 4. 
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III. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
CONTEXT 
 
Brazil’s bingo halls were local institutions and the corruption problems they generated were 
manifested within a national setting. Notably though, many of the institutions and instruments 
that Brazil deployed to reimpose illegality had their origins in or were influenced by 
international norms and standards. Consideration of the international context therefore may 
provide insight into what the Brazilian state gained from reversion to illegality as its primary 
regulatory instrument for the bingo hall.  
 
Three elements of that context are important to the legalisation and subsequent re-
criminalisation of Brazil’s bingo halls. The first is the opening of Brazil’s economy, especially 
its borders, during the 1990s and into the 21st century as the economic plans of the first post-
dictatorship presidents strove to reintegrate the country into the global economy. The second 
element is the emergence of circumstances that held out the tantalising prospect of Brazil 
attaining its longstanding historical aspirations to be regarded as an influential country that 
wields soft power internationally. The third important element is the proliferation of 
international instruments to criminalise flows of finance and of disfavoured goods and services.  
 
These elements are interconnected. Brazil’s aspirations to be seen as globally significant 
were strengthened by the trade deals opened its borders; and its newly opened borders both 
challenged and inspired the government to accede to international instruments that demand the 
deployment of criminalisation to disrupt cross-border flows of impugned goods, services, and 
capital. Transposition of the international treaties into domestic law provided a framework and 
resources to assist with the management of borders and as such to strengthen an aspect of 
sovereignty that is conventionally understood in terms of a state’s control over entry and exit 
from its territory. That international context also afforded Brazil an opportunity to demonstrate 
its capacity to internalize emerging international norms and standards about financial flows, to 
collect financial information, and to use the information to discipline domestic institutions and 
markets.96 By showing that it could act responsibly and effectively against illicit financial 
flows, Brazil then strengthened its claims for influence in relation to global initiatives to 
construct financial security as a pressing international concern.  
 
The following subparts elaborate on these claims. The first summarises evidence from 
early in the 21st century of the success of Brazil’s ambitions to wield soft power. The second 
subpart turns to the developing international order on the criminalisation of financial flows that 
stem from illegal sources or are deployed to nefarious ends and considers how norms and 
standards adapted from this international order related to aspects of bingo regulation in Brazil, 
especially its reversion to illegality.  
 
A. LOOKING OUT: THE QUEST FOR ‘SOFT’ POWER AND 
INFLUENCE 
 
                                                 
96 This capacity might be considered, drawing on Foucault, a more “governmental“ form of sovereignty. Marieke 
de Goede, analyses the exercise of this type of sovereignty in relation to financial flows in Speculative Security: 
The politics of pursuing terrorist monies (U of Minnesota Press: 2012). 
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Brazil’s longstanding desire for international recognition as a significant actor in world affairs 
is well-documented.97 According to Soares de Lima and Hirst, for example, “Brazil’s major 
foreign policy aspiration has been to achieve international recognition in accordance with its 
belief that it should assume its ‘natural’ role as a ‘big country’ in world affairs.”98 As these 
authors—and others—observe, this aspiration to wield soft power, at least through “a middle 
ground international role,”99 is in part a consequence of its size and resources. Brazil is a big 
country in terms of territory, population, and economy.100 It has more international borders 
than all other countries apart from Russia and China and one of the world’s longest coastlines. 
It is the state with the largest territory in the Southern hemisphere and is custodian of much of 
the world’s biodiversity.101  
 
Brazil has sought to realise its aspirations to soft power through active engagement with 
high profile political institutions and international events. It is a founding member of the UN, 
an energetic campaigner for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to which it has been 
elected 10 times (second only to Japan); and since 1955, by well-established tradition, Brazil 
speaks first at the general debate of the UN General Assembly.102 Brazil founded the World 
Social Forum and has hosted more of its meetings than any other country.103 Over time, the 
country has reached a stage where it is often included in clubs and decision-making fora for 
significant states but it has not had a lot of success in securing leadership positions in 
organisations created and dominated by rich and historically-influential states. 
 
An important boost to Brazil’s leadership ambitions occurred in 2001 when a paper about 
global economic developments included the country in a group of four “emerging market” 
economies that were likely to be key agents of global growth in the 21st century. Forecasting 
that the real GDP growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China would exceed that of the G7 in 
2001 and 2002, this paper heralded the arrival of the construct of the “BRICs countries” in 
international political economy discourse.104 Noting how little commonality there is among the 
                                                 
97 See Trinkunas, supra note 9, and sources cited therein. 
98 Mariana R. Soares de Lima & Mônica Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice 
and responsibilities” (2006) 82:1 International Affairs at 21. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Brazil is the world’s fifth largest country by territory (larger than continental US), containing almost half (47 
per cent) of the South American Continent; and the 6th largest by population. At its most recent peak, Brazil’s 
GDP was ranked 5th (or 6th) in the world. Even in 2016, while still in the throes of a deep economic crisis, Brazil’s 
economy ranks 9th in terms of nominal GDP, and PPP, ahead of Canada, Australia, Russia, Mexico and other rich 
or large countries; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators, 2016” online: <data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/GDP-ranking-table>. 
101  Brazil is one of 17 “megadiverse” countries, “which have been identified as the most biodiversity-rich 
countries of the world with a particular focus on endemic biodiversity.” UN Environmental Protection and World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre, “A to Z Areas of Biodiversity Importance” online: <biodiversitya-
z.org/content/megadiverse-countries>. For in-depth discussion, see Rudolph A. Mittermeier, P.R Gill and C.G. 
Mittermeier, Megadiversity: Earth’s Biologically Nations (Cemex: Mexico City, Mexico, 1997). 
102 See United Nations, Frequently Asked Questions: General Debate, n.d., online: <gadebate.un.org/en/faq>. 
103 Manisha Desai, “SWS 2015 Feminist Lecture: The Gendered Geographies of Struggle: The World Social 
Forum and Its Sometimes Overlapping Other Worlds” (2016) 30:6 Gender & Society 869–889. 
104 Jim O’Neill, “The world needs better economic BRICs” (2001) Global Economic Paper Series. O’Neill’s 
prediction was reinforced 2 years later by a second paper from his colleagues in the Goldman Sachs Research 
Department, forecasting that the BRICs could become much more significant to the world economy than anyone 
had anticipated and that this result could materialise quite quickly: “If things go right, in less than 40 years, the 
BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms. By 2025 they could account for over 
half the size of the G6. Of the current G6, only the US and Japan may be among the six largest economies in US 
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BRIC countries, and how disinterested India and China were in the classification, Rohter 
describes the grouping—with some justification—as an artificial construct invented as a 
Goldman Sachs marketing exercise,105 but it was subsequently accepted as meaningful.106 
 
Brazil’s inclusion among the BRICs stemmed from changes in its economy that had 
occurred in the late 1980s after the restoration of democracy. Economic reforms to privatise 
state enterprises and curb Brazil’s monstrous rates of hyper-inflation were initiated by 
Fernando Collor de Mello, the first elected president to take office in Brazil after the 1988 
constitution.107 These reforms were substantially overhauled and redeveloped as the “Plano 
Real,” by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, first as finance minister to Itamar Franco, Collor de 
Mello’s successor as President, and then carried on through Cardoso’s own tenure as president. 
Taken together, the reform programs have resulted in the privatisation of more than 100 state 
enterprises, a dismantling of barriers to foreign investment, the end of hyper-inflation, and 
substantial diversification of Brazil’s economy.108 They enabled twin track development of 
industrial and agricultural sectors and facilitated exploitation of the country’s extensive and 
varied resources including its young, economically active population as well as the land, water, 
and vast deposits of minerals for which Brazil is known. These economic policies, which 
largely continued through Lula’s presidency, over fierce objections of many members and 
supporters of the Workers Party that he led, have brought considerable capital investment into 
the country since the early 1990s.109 As an enormous economy that imports and exports capital, 
Brazil also has become subject to scrutiny of the risks to financial stability and global security 
that its capital flows potentially may create or exacerbate. Because of its size and significance 
to the global economy, Brazil’s relationship to international regimes for managing the risks of 
financial flows was, by the start of the 21st century, increasingly considered important.110  
 
                                                 
dollar terms in 2050”; Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050” 
(2003) 99 Goldman Sachs at 2. 
105 Rohter, supra note 9 at 226. For an interesting discussion of some differences in the configurations of the 
economies of BRICs states, see Andrea Goldstein, “The Political Economy of Global Business: The Case of the 
BRICs” (2013) 4:2 Global Policy 162–172; Joe Leahy, “Brazil: the first big ‘Soft’ power” Financial Times (22 
February 2013). 
106 Gregory T. Chin, “The BRICS-led Development Bank: Purpose and Politics beyond the G20” (2014) 5:3 
Global Policy 366–373; See also https://www.ndb.int; For a nuanced analysis that explores the differences in 
orientation and approach amongst the BRICs members in a global economic context see Kristen Hopewell, 
“Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization” (2015) 
22:2 Review of International Political Economy 311–338. 
107 Plano Brasil Novo combined liberalised trade and investment regulation with extensive privatisation as part of 
an inflation stabilization policy to decrease debt service costs. For an excellent discussion of Brazil’s privatisation 
process from 1991-2001, one of the largest in the world but rarely studied, see Francisco Anuatti-Neto, Milton 
Barossi-Filho, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho and Roberto Macedo, “Os efeitos da privatização sobre o 
desempenho econômico e financeiro das empresas privatizadas” (2005) 59:2 Revista Brasileira de Economia 151–
175. For discussions of Collor de Mello’s market reforms set in the context of wider developments in Latin 
America, see Luigi Manzetti and Charles H. Blake, “Market reforms and corruption in Latin America: New means 
for old ways” (1996) 3 Review of International Political Economy 662–697. 
108 Anuatti-Neto, supra note 107. 
109 Maria de Lourdes Rollemberg Mollo and Alfredo Saad-Filho, “Neoliberal economic policies in Brazil (1994-
2005): Cardoso, Lula and the need for a democratic alternative” (2006) 11:1 New Political Economy 99–123. 
110 Maira Machado, “Similar in their differences: transnational legal processes addressing money laundering in 
Brazil and Argentina” (2012) 37:2 Law & Social Inquiry 330–66. Brazil joined the G20 in 1999/2000 and the 
FATF-GAFI in 1999/2000. For extensive discussion of the new international groupings and institutions that were 
developed at the turn of the 21st century to help manage the destabilizing risks of capital flows, see generally, 
Tony Porter, Globalization and Finance, (Polity: 2005). 
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B. LOOKING INWARDS: PERCEPTIONS OF BRAZIL AND GLOBAL 
CRIMINALITY RISK 
 
Co-extensive with the opening up of its borders and the influx of foreign capital, Brazil became 
integrated into an emerging “anti-money laundering transnational order” governing flows of 
impugned capital between and within nation states. Launched in 1988 as part of a US-led “war 
on drugs,” this evolving collection of global and local norms, institutions, interests, and 
practices has developed into a core area of contemporary transnational regulation.111 The first 
international instrument to include provisions to combat money laundering is Article 5 of the 
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. 112  While the scope of this instrument is limited to the proceeds of narcotics 
trafficking, the treaty introduced mandatory measures that have become the bedrock of 
international controls on illicit financial flows, including the confiscation of proceeds, enabling 
the tracing of impugned funds through records held by banks and other firms, and obligations 
to co-operate with other jurisdictions in confiscation and tracing processes.113  Equivalent 
international measures were extended to the financing of “terrorism” in 1999,114 to “organised 
crime” and “transnational” criminal offences in 2000,115 and to “corruption” in 2003.116  
 
Several international organisations are involved in development and implementation of 
the international normative order that governs financial flows, the most significant of which is 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—also known by its French name, Groupe d’action 
financière (GAFI)—an intergovernmental organisation that began life, essentially, as a club of 
wealthy, influential nations, at the 1989 G-7 Economic Summit in Paris. 117  The FATF 
generates normative standards to combat money laundering (and financing of terrorism), 
                                                 
111 Machado, supra note 110.  
112 E/CONF.82/14. 
113 This article requires States parties, inter alia, to adopt measures to enable (1) confiscation of the proceeds of 
narcotics trafficking; and (2) competent authorities to identify, trace, and freeze or seize proceeds (3) to empower 
courts or other competent authorities to order seizure of bank, financial and commercial records be made available 
or be seized; (4) not to allow bank secrecy to be used as a defence to seizure of records and to cooperate with 
other jurisdictions as required. Brazil signed the convention on the day it opened for signature (20 December 
1988), albeit with a reservation, and ratified it some 2.5 years later in July 1991. Confiscation/forfeiture of illegal 
drugs and trafficking paraphernalia and their proceeds was already an established remedy in Brazilian law under 
Decreto-Lei nº 1.455, of 7 April 1976 and Decreto-Lei nº 7560 of 19 December 1986. 
114  “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism” (1999) online: 
<treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/english-18-11.pdf> [perma.cc/49UU-W5WN]. 
115  “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” (2000) online: 
<unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html> [perma.cc/GJQ7-52DB]. 
116 “United Nations Convention against Corruption” (2003) online: <unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/uncac.html> 
[perma.cc79WS-DAM2]; Brazil is also a signatory to the OECD OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which it ratified in 2000, OECD, “Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” (2011) online: < 
oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf> [perma.cc/Y4B8-ZLGR]; and the Organization of 
American States, “Inter-American Convention against Corruption” online: 
<oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_B-58_against_Corruption_signatories.asp> [perma.cc/DN76-
3KED], which Brazil signed in 1996 and ratified in 2002. 
117 It was founded with 16 members, which then increased to 28 after publication of the first edition of the money 
laundering standards. Brazil, Argentina and Mexico became members in 2000, taking the total membership to 31. 
The FATF currently comprises 35 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organisations (the EU and the drawn from 
major financial centres across the world. Other international and transnational bodies, including the EU and the 
UN, also monitor the development and institutionalization of the anti-money laundering international order within 
nation states.  
 
171
Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 30 [2018], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol30/iss1/8
  
produces authoritative knowledge about practices for masking the origins (e.g. money 
laundering) or destinations (e.g. terrorism financing or corruption) of impugned funds, and co-
ordinates global responses to the threats posed by money laundering, and terrorism 
financing.118 Its compliance machinery relies on processes of peer review, mutual evaluation 
and naming/shaming and it has extended its reach while limiting its governance and decision-
making membership by creating a distributed network of associated “FATF-style Regional 
Bodies” that conduct peer reviews and mutual evaluation of countries within their regions.119 
 
Brazil was not invited to join the FATF until 1999/2000, some ten years after the 
organisation was founded and had published its standards. However, signs of the influence of 
the norms it oversees appear in Brazilian law well before it became a member. Within two 
years of being listed as “a [l]ocation in which action is needed to stem and prevent money 
laundering in order to make headway into the international money-laundering problem,”120 
Brazil had enacted a comprehensive anti-money laundering law, Lei No 9613/1998,121 that 
essentially met FATF standards on money laundering and extended the international measures 
to combat corruption. This law took effect in the same year as Lei Pelé, the legislation that 
shifted regulatory authority over bingo halls to the federal government after corruption scandals 
had damaged several of the state-based regulators of bingo halls. Notably, the bingo sector was 
almost immediately targeted as a site for supplementary rule-making by the Conselho de 
Controle de Atividades Financeiras (COAF), a financial intelligence unit established under the 
new money-laundering law to meet the FATF standards for the gathering and processing of 
financial information.122  
 
After a generally successful assessment of its domestic anti-money laundering 
regulation, Brazil joined the FATF in 2000.123 This marker of integration into the global anti-
money laundering order occurred in the same year as an important milestone in its history of 
                                                 
118 In 1990 the FATF first published its “40 Recommendations” global regulatory standards to combat money 
laundering, and added standards to combat the terrorism financing in 2001. It subsequently revised its standards 
in 1996, 2003/04, 2012 and Nov 2017. For insightful analysis of Brazil’s (and Argentina’s) experience with the 
FATF organization, see Machado, supra note 110. 
119 Financial Action Task Force, “High-Level Principles for the relationship between the FATF and the FATF-
style regional bodies” (2018) online: <fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/High-
Level%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%20FATF%20and%20FSRBs.pdf> [perma.cc/9QPQ-
M8H5]. 
120  US General Accounting Office, 1996, Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding US Efforts 
Overseas GAO/GGD-96-105, (GAO: Washington, D.C) at 29. The list of medium risk countries is: Argentina, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Antilles, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, and the United Arab Emirates. The 17 high risk countries are: Aruba, 
Canada, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, 
Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, the U.K., the United States, and Venezuela.  
121 Machado, supra, note 110 at 342. Lei No 9613/1998, extends the predicate offences for money laundering to 
include “terrorism” arms smuggling and trafficking, kidnapping, bribery and other acts “detrimental to 
government authorities” “acts harmful to the Brazilian financial system” and “acts performed by criminal 
organizations.” It applies the sanction of confiscation and provisional measures (including asset seizure and 
freezing during investigations) to the proceeds of such offences, creates a financial intelligence unit, the Conselho 
de Controle de Atividades Financeiras, (COAF), and provides for international cooperation and preventative 
measures including customer identification, record keeping and suspicious transaction reporting. 
122 COAF Resolution No. 005, of July 2, 1999 and Resolution No. 009, of December 5, 2000 made specific 
provision for bingo halls in terms of records, identification and suspicious transaction reports. 
123 The only aspect in which it was judged less than fully compliant in 2000 concerned procedural protections for 
bank secrecy that were thought to impede information gathering about suspicious accounts. Brazil responded by 
reforming its law in 2001, LC 105/2001. 
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bingo regulation: enactment of the law (Lei Maguito) that started the process of closing Brazil’s 
bingo market.124 Over the ensuing years, as bingo entrepreneurs battled to keep their businesses 
through court actions and lobbying state governments, the federal government developed a 
sophisticated and proactive domestic architecture to combat money laundering and corruption, 
including the Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção e à Lavagem de Dinheiro 
(ENCCLA), the national strategy against money laundering and corruption,125  specialised 
Federal Courts (2003), prosecutors’ offices and federal police divisions, 126  and new 
prosecutorial instruments. These institutions were actively and successfully deployed against 
the bingo sector, for example, in operations to halt the corruption of courts where judges were 
bribed to extend operating licences. Brazil underwent another FATF review in 2004/2005. 
Noting that bingos were one of the more common methods of money laundering used in Brazil, 
this evaluation nonetheless found Brazil largely compliant with the anti-money laundering (but 
not Terrorism Financing) standards.127  
 
The assiduousness and urgency with which Brazil engaged with corruption control and 
anti-money laundering standards did not go unnoticed or unrewarded. In 2008, one year after 
the country had reverted to illegality in the bingo sector, Brazil assumed the rotating presidency 
of the FATF, the first South American country to play this role. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has explored the regulation of commercial bingo in Brazil, looking at how the 
sector developed under legalization and the state’s failure to develop a sustainable model of 
regulation. Because this failure is unusual in the contemporary world and does not fit the 
gambling proliferation thesis, the article has sought to identify distinctive aspects of Brazil’s 
relationship with bingo and to understand the perceived benefits of its reversion to illegality. 
Brazil closed its bingo market not because of harm to players or to suppress play as such, but 
rather to contain the risk to the public interest that the bingo hall came to represent. This risk 
arose from the property relations that constituted the bingo hall, including the ownership and 
management of bingo businesses and equipment such as electronic gaming machines. Together 
with the business relationships that bingo halls fostered, these relations, over time, became 
channels for illegal funds and created threats to the integrity of public powers. 
 
Through analysis of the places that bingo halls became, their place in Brazilian society and the 
place of Brazil in a globalizing world, the article has generated new insights into factors that 
may influence domestic policy choices about regulating gambling markets. The article does 
not claim conclusively to explain why Brazil reverted to illegality rather than continuing its 
search for a sustainable model of regulation—the associations the article has identified are as 
yet correlations rather than causes—but the analysis has identified two key issues for further 
research and development that may be of importance beyond the Brazilian case. First, it has 
confirmed the importance of investigating the property and investment relations that constitute 
gambling spaces and places. While much gambling research focuses primarily on consumption 
                                                 
124 In 2000 Brazil also ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions. 
125 Money laundering was part of the ENCCLA’s remit from 2004 and corruption was added in 2006.  
126 The specialised prosecutors are in the Justice Department’s Department of Assets Recovery and International 
Legal Co-operation (DRCI); the specialised police division is the Divisão de Repressão de Crimes 
Financeiros(DFIN), the division for combating financial crimes. 
127  Brazil: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, June 2005 IMF Country Report No. 05/207. 
173
Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 30 [2018], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol30/iss1/8
  
risks, in the case of Brazil, the more significant risks for understanding the fate of its regulation 
concerned production of the bingo hall. Second, the analysis shows that consideration of the 
international context of gambling regulation may yield valuable insights into national 
regulatory decisions and processes, even in the case of bingo, a game that often is seen as 
quintessentially local. While this article’s discussion of the particular significance and 
influence of the international context to developments in Brazil is suggestive rather than 
definitive, its intended contribution to the field is to stimulate debate and open up additional 
lines of inquiry.  
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